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I. INTRODUCTION
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated."' The purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to serve as a
safeguard for the people against government intrusion;2 however, the
recent decision in United States v. Robinson illustrates how courts have
taken the bite out of this covenant, reducing it to mere rhetoric. The
court in Robinson held that a warrantless aerial surveillance of an occu-
pied, private residence with infared thermal detection is a constitutional
search.' This decision marks the culmination of decisions formulating
bad law from within the Eleventh Circuit and from other circuits as
well.5
This Casenote contends that the Robinson court has taken a ride
down the proverbial slippery slope and has reached rock bottom.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. See id.
3. See United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1995). Over the past three
decades courts have gradually chipped away at the Fourth Amendment's armor in pursuit of
affording the government more flexibility in its fight against crime. See, e.g., Scott E. Sundby,
"Everyman "'s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Government and Citizen, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1751 (1994) (explaining dilution of Fourth Amendment).
4. Robinson, 62 F.3d at 1330.
5. In addition to an Eleventh Circuit case three other circuits, have held that warantless
thermal surveillance is not violative of the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Ishmael, 48
F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Meyers, 46 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Ford, 34 F.3d 992 (lth Cir. 1994); United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir. 1994).
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Through its logic and interpretation of the law, the Eleventh Circuit has
furnished the government with new and powerful ammunition for its
fight towards free reign into the private lives of citizens.6 Part II of this
Casenote discusses the facts of United States v. Robinson; Part III traces
the development of relevant Fourth Amendment case law; and Part IV
analyzes the Robinson court's rationale.
II. FACTS
In December, 1991, Agent Charles West of the Narcotics Division
of the Alabama Department of Public Safety was informed that numer-
ous high-pressure, sodium lights had been shipped from California to
Theodore Robinson, Sr.'s address in Tuskegee, Alabama.7 West's
investigation revealed that Robinson had ordered similar equipment in
1989 and 1990.8 Subsequently, West subpoenaed utility records which
showed that the defendant's house had a higher electrical consumption
than houses of comparable size.9 Additionally, Agent West noticed that
Robinson owned an attractive house with a swimming pool, yet the Ala-
bama Department of Revenue had no record of Robinson's having filed
income tax returns. 10
"After collecting this information, Agent West directed a helicopter
crew to conduct a Forward Looking Infrared Receiver ("FLIR"), thermal
imaging examination1 to compare the heat emanating from Robinson's
home with the intensity of heat from surrounding objects." 2 The level
of heat emitted from Robinson's was consistent with the level of heat
generated by indoor hydroponics equipment.1 3  After gathering this
information, Agent West applied for a search warrant of Robinson's
home.' 4 On January 31, 1992, Agent West and others executed the
6. In Part IV-(A), this Casenote will discuss the court's implication that individuals must
make themselves aware of new technology and take affirmative measures to combat the use of
highly advanced equipment in order to preserve their Fourth Amendment rights. See Robinson,
62 F.3d at 1329.
7. See id. at 1327.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id. These facts are more relevant to the collateral issue in this case of whether
probable cause existed to search the defendant's home. See id. at 1331.
11. Thermal imagers detect the heat emanating from the targeted object as frequencies within
the infared spectrum. This heat, which is imperceivable by the unaided eye, is then displayed as
an image on a screen. The device highlights manmade sources of heat as a white color and cooler
temperatures as a shade of gray. See State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 595 (Wash. 1994).
12. Robinson, 62 F.3d at 1327.
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search warrant and found an indoor marijuana growing operation. 5
Robinson was charged in the Middle District of Alabama 6 with the
manufacture and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.17
"Robinson moved to suppress the marijuana seized from his home pur-
suant to the search warrant [however,] [f]ollowing a suppression hear-
ing, the district court denied his motion."' 8 Robinson pled guilty and
received a sentence of 130 months in prison, followed by seven years of
supervised release.19
On appeal, Robinson argued that the FLIR search of his house con-
stituted an illegal search under the Fourth Amendment. 20 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district
court's decision and held that "aerial surveillance of an occupied, private
residence with infared thermal detection as an indication that marijuana
is being cultivated inside is [not] an unconstitutional search."'2' This
holding was based on the court's conclusions that Robinson did not have
a subjective expectation of privacy in the heat emanating from his house,
and, even if he did have a subjective expectation of privacy, this expec-
tation is not one that society is ready to recognize as an objectively rea-
sonable expectation.22
III. RELEVANT FOURTH AMENDMENT HISTORY
Like most courts faced with the issue of whether a Fourth Amend-
ment search has occurred, the Robinson court begins its analysis 23 by
discussing Katz v. United States.24 While Katz and its progeny still con-
trol modem jurisprudence concerning Fourth Amendment searches, it is
useful to recognize the development of law leading up to the Katz deci-
sion. This Casenote contends that the Robinson court has incorporated
into its decision language and rationale found in pre-Katz decisions,
thereby initiating a process which may take the Eleventh Circuit full-
circle and return Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to a pre-Katz
paradigm.25
Originally, courts utilized property law concepts to interpret the
15. See id.




20. See id. Robinson also contended that there were insufficient facts for probable cause to
issue the warrant to search his house. See id.
21. Id. at 1327.
22. See id. at 1329-30.
23. Id. at 1328.
24. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
25. This phenomenon illustrates not only the recent trend towards crime control, but it also
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scope of the Fourth Amendment. In 1928 The Supreme Court held in
Olmstead v. United States that messages passing over telephone wires
were not within the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasona-
ble search and seizure. 26 The Olmstead Court held that since the wiretap
had been placed on wires outside the defendant's premises, no Fourth
Amendment violation occurred. 27 In other words, the Fourth Amend-
ment could only be violated by an actual physical invasion of the
defendant's property. 28 Furthermore, the Court held that the Fourth
Amendment applied only to "places" and "things;" and since the tap
intercepted only intangible conversations, a Fourth Amendment viola-
tion did not occur.29
This "trespass equals search" analysis was reiterated in Goldman v.
United States.30 In Goldman, the Court held that a microphone placed
against the outer wall of a private office was not a physical trespass, and
that therefore no Fourth Amendment violation could have occurred.3'
Ten years later, in On Lee v. United States, the Court again relied on a
physical trespass analysis. 32 The Court held that a search did not occur
when the police overheard conversations through the use of a "bug" on
an undercover agent where the agent had been invited onto the defend-
ant's property because no trespass had occurred. 33
In 1961, the Court in Silverman v. United States held that electronic
surveillance accomplished through physical trespass violated the Fourth
Amendment, despite the fact that intangible conversations, not specifi-
cally "places" or "things," were involved.34 This decision did not elimi-
nate the physical trespass analysis set forth in Olmstead.35 However, the
Court held that an individual's Fourth Amendment rights depended on
the tenuous distinction between a "spike mike" which penetrates a wall 36
and a microphone placed on the outside of a wall.37 In his concurrence
in Silverman, Justice Douglas argued that "the depth of the penetration
suggests that modem technology has outgrown the limits set forth in Katz concerning
governmental intrusion into private lives. See id.
26. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928).
27. Id.
28. See id.
29. Id. at 464.
30. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
31. Id. at 134.
32. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
33. Id. at 751-52.
34. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961). To listen to the defendant in that
case, the police inserted a "spike mike" under the baseboard of a wall until it touched a heating
duct which ran throughout the defendant's home. Id at 506.
35. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466.
36. See Silverman, 365 U.S. at 512.
37. See Goldman, 316 at 134.
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of the electronic device.., is not the measure of the injury. Our con-
cern should not be with the trivialities of the local law of trespass.
38
Six years later, in Katz, the Supreme Court expressly overruled
Olmstead and Goldman.39 The Court held that a warrantless electronic
eavesdropping is an illegal search and seizure, even though no physical
trespass onto the speaker's property occurs, and even though it involves
only intangible conversations.4 ° In Katz, the defendant was convicted of
illegally transmitting wagering information via telephone from Los
Angeles to Miami to Boston. 41 At his trial, tapes of his conversations,
recorded by a device attached to the outside of a public telephone booth
by FBI agents, were admitted into evidence.42 No physical intrusion
into the booth occurred.43 The majority reasoned that even though the
defendant did not take every precaution against electronic eavesdrop-
ping, Fourth Amendment protections must be afforded to a person who
justifiably relies upon the privacy of a particular place, be that a home,
office, car, or telephone booth."
In contrast, Justice Harlan's concurring opinion suggested a two-
pronged test for determining whether a person is afforded Fourth
Amendment protections in a particular situation. 5 This test required
"first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared
to recognize as 'reasonable.' ' 46 This test has become the first step in
analyzing Fourth Amendment surveillance cases. However, while the
test itself is unchanging, its application by various courts has been any-
thing but uniform.
IV. THE ROBINSON COURT'S ANALYSIS
The Robinson court begins its discussion, ironically, by reciting the
Fourth Amendment. 47 The court then states that in Ford "we held that
the ground surveillance of an unoccupied mobile home on leased land
with a thermal infared heat detector did not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment."4 Next, the Robinson court cites three cases from three different
38. Silverman, 365 U.S. at 513 (Douglas, J., concurring).
39. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
40. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
41. See id. at 348.
42. See id.
43. See id. at 349.
44. Id. at 353.
45. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
46. Id.
47. Robinson, 62 F.3d at 1328 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV). However, as the discussion
proceeds, these words are diluted beyond recognition.
48. See id. (citing United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992 (11th Cir. 1994)).
1997]
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circuits which have also concluded that the use of thermal infared sur-
veillance or FLIR does not constitute an unconstitutional search.4 9 This
Casenote contends that the warrantless use of thermal imagery is always
a violation of a person's Fourth Amendment rights. Moreover, because
the facts in Robinson are unique, by applying the holdings of these other
cases, the Robinson court has further eroded the Fourth Amendment by
both applying and misapplying unsound law.5°
The Robinson court begins its analysis by noting that the Katz test
requires that a party alleging an unconstitutional search under the Fourth
Amendment must establish both a subjective and an objective expecta-
tion of privacy to succeed.51 In addition, the court noted that it must
determine whether Robinson had a subjective expectation of privacy that
society would recognize as objectively reasonable. 52  The Robinson
court begins its analysis by focusing on Robinson's subjective expecta-
tion of privacy. 3
A. Subjective Expectation of Privacy
The Robinson court concedes that previously in Ford, the court's
conclusion that the defendant-appellant held no subjective expectation of
privacy "turned on his purposefully venting the heat from his marijuana
cultivation inside the mobile home with an electric blower through holes
drilled in the floor." 54 Unlike Ford, Robinson did not vent heat from his
marijuana growing operation, nor did he "deliberately assist the emis-
sion of heat in any way."55 Furthermore, in all of the other cases used
by the Robinson court to support its holding, the defendant-appellant
49. See Robinson, 62 F.3d at 1328; United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056 (8th
Cir. 1994).
50. See Robinson, 62 F.3d at 1327; Ishmael, 48 F.3d at 851; Myers, 46 F.3d at 669; Ford, 34
F.3d at 993; Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1058. Unsound law is often the result of applying holdings to
cases where the facts are similar but distinguishable. Stare decisis is a necessary doctrine which
helps provide stability and guidance to our legal system. However, each case has facts unique to
itself, and courts must be wary in their use of precedent. Like the childhood game "telephone,"
the holdings of cases change one fact at a time. Eventually, the original holding will evolve into
an entirely new animal. When this new animal rears its ugly face, protected under the province of
stare decisis, a long and painstaking process is often required to rid the legal system of the
monster it created.
51. Robinson, 62 F.3d at 1328 (citing United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 995 (11th Cir. 1994)
(citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 361) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
52. Id. at 1328.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. (emphasis omitted). Also, the Ford court never characterized the targeted property as
a "home." However, in Robinson, it is clear that the targeted structure was indeed a "home." The
issue of an individual's expectation of privacy in the home is discussed in Part IV-(B).
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deliberately vented the heat.5 6
In Myers, the court stated that Myers did not have a subjective
expectation of privacy in the heat emitted because Myers purposefully
discharged the heat from his home through vents on his roof.57 The
Myers court also cited Ford to support its conclusion concerning the
vented heat. 8
In Pinson, where the heat was deliberately vented, the court failed
to decide whether the appellant-defendant had a subjective expectation
of privacy. 9 Instead, the court stated that "[a]ny subjective expectation
of privacy Pinson may have had in the heat radiated from his house is
not one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.""'6 There-
fore, the decision in Pinson lends no support to the subjective expecta-
tion analysis in the Robinson decision. Moreover, in Pinson, where the
heat was voluntarily vented, the court still did not rule out the fact that
the defendant-appellant may indeed have had a subjective expectation of
privacy in the heat.6"
Finally, in Ishmael, the court held that the defendants-appellees had
a subjective expectation of privacy even though the Ishmaels had delib-
erately vented the heat through an exhaust fan that ran continuously. 62
Nonetheless, the court reasoned that "[t]hough the Ishmaels did not-
indeed, could not-take every precaution against the detection of the
hydroponics laboratory, the balance of the evidence demonstrates that
the Ishmaels exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy. 63
An analysis of the four cases cited by the Robinson court to support
its general holding reveals that all of these cases involved a defendant
who intentionally vented the heat.' Consequently, the Robinson court
must address "whether inaction can be as revealing regarding the subjec-
tive expectation of privacy as action. 65 The court then phrases the issue
as whether Robinson had a subjective expectation of privacy in the heat
56. See United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 851 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Myers, 46
F.3d 668, 669 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1058 (8th Cir. 1994).
57. Myers, 46 F.3d at 669.
58. Id.
59. Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1058-59.
60. Id. at 1059.
61. Id. at 1058-59.
62. Ishmael, 48 F.3d at 854-55. Furthermore, the structure at issue was not a home but was a
large steel building located in an open field. The issue of an individual's expectation of privacy in
the home is discussed in Part IV-(B).
63. Id.
64. United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 851 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Myers, 46
F.3d 668, 669 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 993 (11th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1058 (8th Cir. 1994).
65. Robinson, 62 F.3d at 1328.
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generated by his indoor marijuana cultivation.66
In finding that Robinson did not have a subjective expectation of
privacy, the court errs in two ways.67 First, the court reasons that it must
look only at Robinson's subjective expectation of privacy in the emitted
heat.68 The court explicitly rejects the "balance of the evidence" ration-
ale offered in Ishmael which suggests that a court must also take into
consideration a person's subjective expectation in the activities associ-
ated with the resulting heat emissions.69 Instead, the Robinson court
opines that because the FLIR measures only the emitted heat, the sole
issue is whether Robinson had a subjective expectation of privacy in the
emitted heat, described as nothing more than a byproduct.70 Second,.the
court states that "Robinson's inaction regarding the heat generated from
his marijuana cultivation demonstrates his lack of concern for it" thus,
concluding that Robinson did not establish a subjective expectation of
privacy in the heat emitted from his home.171
By limiting the scope of its analysis to the emitted heat,72 the
Robinson court fails to acknowledge the defendant's full expectation of
privacy. The issue is not only the heat, but more importantly, the activity
revealed by the heat. In ignoring this point, the Robinson court fails to
recognize that the heat and the activity generating the heat are inextrica-
bly intertwined.
This concept, that heat emissions and the heat-generating activity
cannot be severed from one another, is illustrated by the Ishmael rec-
ord.73 In Ishmael, a Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") officer
used a thermal imager to record heat emanating from the defendant's
steel building. 74 The officer "displayed his recordings to two DEA ther-
mographers, both of whom concluded that the Ishmaels were illegally
cultivating marijuana in the steel building's structure. '75 The thermal
imagery process is similar to the use of an X-ray machine because it
allows the operator to "see" through walls and obtain information about





69. Id. at 1328-29 n.4 (citing United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 854 (5th Cir. 1995)).
70. Id. at 1329.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1328.
73. Ishmael, 48 F.3d at 852.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. The Robinson court nevertheless argued that thermal imagery is not the equivalent of an
X-ray machine. Robinson, 62 F.3d at 1330.
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An individual has a subjective expectation of privacy not only in
the emitted heat, but also in the activity creating the heat because it is
the activity which is ultimately revealed to the operator of a thermal
imager.77 For example, in Katz, the Court's analysis was not limited to
the vibrations on the glass panels of the telephone booth created by the
noises emanating from the defendant's vocal chords, but instead focused
on the resulting word formations.71 "The Supreme Court in Katz did not
dwell upon these physical minutiae, but, rather, recognized that the
Fourth Amendment broadly protects from government intrusion that
which a person reasonably seeks to keep private."'7 9
The Robinson court's failure to take into account the activity
revealed by the heat is understandable, however, inexcusable. It is diffi-
cult to fully understand the limits of modern technology. However, in a
Fourth Amendment analysis, just as vibrations made by vocal chords
cannot be severed from the words they form, and just as electronic
pulses originating from computers, faxes and modems cannot be severed
from the messages they ultimately form, heat signatures cannot be sev-
ered from the activities they ultimately reveal. While it is true that an
inference must be made in order to attach heat signatures to the activity
creating the heat, the reality of the procedure is that a person can point a
thermal imager at a home and determine what is going on inside the
home at that exact moment.80 If such were not the case, then the device
would be of little help to law enforcement agents, especially in regards
to obtaining a search warrant based on information provided by a ther-
mal imager. It is illogical and hypocritical to say that on the one hand a
thermal imager is not intrusive and is incapable of revealing any inti-
mate details, while on the other hand using the information obtained
through a thermal imager to help procure a search warrant.
In addition, the Robinson court makes a second, and more critical,
mistake in its analysis of Robinson's subjective expectation of privacy.
Not even taking into consideration what the emitted heat revealed, the
court finds that "[w]hile Robinson attempted to conceal his marijuana
growing operation by conducting it inside his home, the record does not
indicate that he affirmatively took any action to prevent the resulting
heat from being emitted into the atmosphere above his house."8" Based
on this information, the court holds that "Robinson's inaction regarding
the heat generated from his marijuana cultivation demonstrates his lack
77. See Ishmael, 48 F.3d at 852-53.
78. See United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1501 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that the
warrantless use of thermal imagery is unconstitutional).
79. Id. (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967)).
80. See Ishmael, 48 F.3d at 851.
81. Robinson, 62 F.3d at 1328-29.
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of concern for it. Thus, we conclude that Robinson has not established a
subjective expectation of privacy in this heat emitted from his home."82
As the Robinson court points out, the burden of demonstrating a
subjective and objective expectation of privacy is on the party alleging
the unconstitutional search under the Fourth Amendment.83 Moreover,
through its conclusion that a person must take affirmative steps in order
to maintain his or her Fourth Amendment protection, the court also
imposes the burden upon individuals of both keeping up with the latest
technological advances to know how to counteract these new devices
and actually attempting to do so.84 According to the court's rationale, if
Superman was employed by the police, an individual would have to line
his or her home with lead walls in order to successfully demonstrate a
subjective expectation of privacy.
"The record shows no consideration for the emitted heat whatso-
ever." 85 This sentence from the Robinson decision would be comical if
it were not terrifying. There is not a homeowner in this country who
shows consideration, in terms of privacy, for the continuous heat their
house emits.86 If deliberately venting heat was similar to a person shout-
ing from an open window, the argument that a person who deliberately
vents heat is ultimately forfeiting his or her expectation of privacy
would be persuasive.87 However, in Robinson, the defendant did not
intentionally vent the heat.88 Therefore, consistent with the shouting
analogy, Mr. Robinson was found to have had no expectation of privacy
in a conversation he had while in his house simply because he failed to
insulate his abode with sound-proof walls.
More importantly, venting heat is not analogous to shouting out of
a window because reading heat emissions requires advanced technologi-
82. Id. at 1329. However, Judge Edmondson does not necessarily agree with the rest of the
court on this issue. In his concurrence, Edmondson writes that he "concurts] in the result and in
the opinion, except for the discussion ... of whether Robinson had a subjective expectation of
privacy in the heat generated by his indoor marijuana cultivation." On that issue, Judge
Edmondson admits to having "considerable doubt." He does not suggest that the court is wrong in
its analysis; however, he does submit that "the answer is less than clear to [him], considering
especially that the court stresses the inaction of a homeowner as the decisive element." Because
the case could have been decided on the objective expectation of privacy issue alone, Edmondson
"decline[s] to decide the unnecessary and, for [him], delicate question of subjective intent." Id. at
1332 (Edmondson, J., concurring).
83. Robinson, 62 F.3d at 1328.
84. Moreover, the significance of this holding is not limited to thermal imagery cases, but to
all cases concerning an individual's right to privacy. Therefore, at least in the Eleventh Circuit,
the Fourth Amendment is on its death bed and technology is waiting to pull the plug.
85. Id. at 1329.
86. Perhaps, with exception to Mr. Robinson, Mr. Ford, Mr. Myers, Mr. Pinson and the
Ishmaels.
87. See Ford, 34 F.3d at 995.
88. Robinson, 62 F.3d at 1328.
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cal equipment which individuals should not be expected to be cognizant
of nor be expected to evade. People cannot be forced to evade uncom-
mon, highly sophisticated technological devices in order to preserve
their expectation of privacy. 9 Therefore, it should not be presumed that
a person who vents heat, whether intentionally or not, is aware that the
government might monitor that heat to determine activities occurring
inside the person's home.
In California v. Greenwood, where respondents put garbage bags
out on the curb to be picked up by the garbage collector, the Court con-
cluded that "[i]t may well be that respondents did not expect that the
contents of their garbage bags would become known to the police or
other members of the public." 90 Though the Court went on to hold that
society is not prepared to recognize this expectation of privacy as rea-
sonable, it did not hold that respondents did not have a subjective expec-
tation of privacy in the trash.91 In light of this decision, it seems
unfathomable that a court would find a person venting heat to have no
subjective expectation of privacy.92
In Robinson, where the defendant did not deliberately vent the heat,
the court gives a final and fatal blow to the already weakened subjective
expectation of privacy standard. The court concludes that inaction is as
revealing as action in regards to an individual's subjective expectation of
privacy.93 Reasoning by analogy, the court not only suggests that a per-
son who places their "garbage" outside has no subjective expectation of
privacy, but, if technology allows, the person who leaves the garbage
inside also has no subjective expectation of privacy in its contents.
Although the Robinson court squeezes yet another drop of acid on
the Fourth Amendment through its conclusion that inaction is the same
as action in regards to a person forfeiting his or her subjective expecta-
tion of privacy, 94 this issue should not be dispositive in warrantless ther-
mal imagery cases. If a person may reasonably expect his or her trash to
not be inspected, although intentionally placed outside,95 a person cer-
89. See Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986) ("Surveillance of
private property by using highly sophisticated surveillance equipment not generally available to
the public... might be constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant."). Furthermore, in Dow, at
issue was the use of a camera, an item found in most American homes.
90. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39 (1988).
91. See id, at 39-40.
92. See, e.g., Ford, 34 F.3d at 995. Common sense dictates that a person placing garbage
bags on the street generally will have a lesser expectation of privacy than the person who vents
heat out into the atmosphere.
93. Robinson, 62 F.3d at 1328.
94. Id. at 1329.
95. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37-39 (1988).
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tainly may reasonably expect his or her vented heat not to be examined
by a thermal imager.
In its opinion, the Robinson court goes to great lengths to downplay
the technological sophistication of a thermal imager.96 The court states
that "[n]o revelation of intimate, even definitive, detail within the house
was detectable" through the use of the thermal imager.97 However, the
court fails to recognize that the level of technology used is inconsequen-
tial. The court concluded that Mr. Robinson had no subjective expecta-
tion of privacy in the emitted heat.93 Therefore, discussing the
sophistication of the thermal imager is pointless. 99
As the court noted in the beginning of its opinion, a party alleging
an unconstitutional search under the Fourth Amendment must prove
both a subjective and an objective expectation of privacy. 00 According
to the court, because Robinson did not have a subjective expectation of
privacy in the heat emitted from his home, he failed in his Fourth
Amendment challenge.' Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit found that
the government may constitutionally ascertain whatever information
possible from the heat emitted from his home. According to this ration-
ale, if the thermal imager, or any other type of equipment, unquestiona-
bly depicted discrete, detailed images from within Mr. Robinson's
home, the court would find that this was not a search because Mr.
Robinson did not take affirmative measures to prevent the heat from
escaping.10 2
B. Objective Expectation of Privacy
After determining that Robinson did not have a subjective expecta-
tion of privacy, the court then proceeds to determine whether Robinson
established the objective component of the Katz two-part test. 0 3 The
96. Robinson, 62 F.3d at 1330.
97. Id.
98. See id. at 1328.
99. In Cusumano, the imager used was capable of resolving heat differentials greater than .5
degree Celsius. See United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1504 n.1 1(10th Cir. 1995). As the
court stated, "It would take no great wit to speculate as to the origin of two mild hot spots,
commingled, in a bedroom at night." Id.; see also United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1531
(W.D. Wis. 1994) (noting that thermal imagers can detect the tear ducts on a face); State v.
Young, 867 P.2d 593, 595 (Wash. 1994) (noting that thermal imagers can detect a human form
through an open, curtained window when the person is leaning against the curtain or when a
person is leaning against a plywood door).
100. Robinson, 62 F.3d at 1328.
101. Id. at 1328-29.
102. And, as the laws of physics dictate, heat has a natural tendency to rise.
103. See Robinson, 62 F.3d at 1329. As previously noted, for Mr. Robinson's purposes, the
courts analysis of his objective expectation of privacy is merely academic in light of his failure to
prove his subjective expectation of privacy.
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court frames the issue as whether the "'government's intrusion
infringe[s] upon the personal and societal values protected by the Fourth
Amendment.""o' Therefore, the court notes that "Robinson would have
to demonstrate that his privacy expectation in the heat rising from his
house would be accepted by society as objectively reasonable."'1 0 5
The Robinson court begins its objective expectation of privacy
analysis by citing Florida v. Riley."°6 In Riley, the Court held that the
use of a helicopter hovering at an elevation of 400 feet to inspect mari-
juana plants through the missing panels in a defendant's greenhouse did
not constitute an unconstitutional search. 1 7 The Court in Riley cited
California v. Ciraolo as controlling.' 08 In Ciraolo, the police, acting on
a tip, inspected the defendant's back-yard while flying in a fixed-winged
aircraft at 1,000 feet.' With the naked eye, the officers saw what they
surmised to be marijuana growing in the yard." 0 The Court held that
the inspection was not a search subject to the Fourth Amendment
because "'[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his
own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protec-
tion."'" The Ciraolo Court went on to reason that "'[i]n an age where
private and commercial flight in the public airways is routine, it is
unreasonable for respondent to expect that his marijuana plants were
constitutionally protected from being observed with the naked eye from
an altitude of 1,000 feet."" 1 2
Both of these decisions were predicated on the fact that visual
observation via a helicopter or airplane traveling in public airways is so
routine that an individual does not have a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in something that is readily exposed to such observation." 3 There-
fore, in such cases, the critical elements are routine flights and visual
observation via the naked eye by the officers.' 14  In fact, Justice
O'Connor, who was the decisive fifth vote, stated in her Riley concur-
rence that the fact that the flight was legal was not dispositive."15 For
Justice O'Connor the correct inquiry was "whether the helicopter was in
the public airways at an altitude at which members of the public travel
104. Id. (citations omitted).
105. Robinson, 62 F.3d at 1329.
106. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
107. Id. at 451-52.
108. Id. at 449 (citing California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986)).
109. Id. (citing Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 209).
110. Id. (citing Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 209).
111. Id. (citing Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213).
112. Id. at 450 (quoting Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215).
113. See id. at 450; accord Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215.
114. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449 (1989); Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215.
115. See Riley, 488 U.S. at 454-55 (O'Conner, J., concurring).
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with sufficient regularity that Riley's expectation of privacy from aerial
observation was not 'one that society is prepared to recognize as reason-
able.""'1 6 Justice O'Conner reasoned that if such flights were not com-
monly made by members of the general public, then "Riley cannot be
said to have 'knowingly expose[d]' his greenhouse to public view."' 1 7
Furthermore, in a comment that is prophetic in light of the Robinson
decision, Justice O'Conner argued that "[t]o require individuals to com-
pletely cover and enclose their curtilage is to demand more than the
'precautions customarily taken by those seeking privacy."'" 8
If the police officers in Riley were equipped with thermal imagers it
is more than probable that the decision would have been different. 9
First, it is certainly not routine for members of the general public to fly
over homes carrying thermal imagers. Second, only five justices were
able to come to the highly guarded and limited holding that exposing
one's property to naked eye aerial visual observation from airplanes and
helicopters in areas where commercial flights are common constitutes
"knowing" exposure.1 20 There is a vast and obvious difference between
the reasonable expectations of privacy attached to the natural exposure
of heat emissions to a thermal imager and the expectations attached to
leaving property exposed to the naked eye.
The Robinson court, quoting Riley, states that "'no intimate details
connected with the use of the home or curtilage were observed.' '1 2
However, this statement is true in Riley only because everything
observed was exposed outside, to the naked eye.122 On the contrary, in
Robinson, the officers obtained information about intimate activities
transpiring inside Robinson's home that were only detectable and dis-
cernible through the use of a highly technical device.12 3
116. Id. (citation omitted).
117. Id. at 455 (O'Conner, J., concurring).
118. Riley, 488 U.S. at 454 (O'Conner, J., concurring) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,
152 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring)). This language is also in direct conflict with the Robinson
court's subjective expectation analysis which requires an individual to take affirmative measures
to conceal heat emissions in order to demonstrate a subjective expectation of privacy. Moreover,
it would be contrary to the laws of physics to completely prevent heat emissions from escaping
from one's home. And, if this feat were attempted by an individual who wanted to keep his or her
heat emissions private, the continuous use of a space-suit would most likely be sufficient only to
prolong that individual's painful and unnatural death.
119. See Riley, 488 U.S. at 449-50. This is especially true in light of Justice O'Conner's
decisive concurrence. See id. at 452-55 (O'Conner, J., concurring).
120. Id. at 450.
121. United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325, 1329 (1 1th Cir. 1995) (quoting Riley, 488 U.S.
at 452) (emphasis added in Robinson).
122. Riley, 488 U.S. at 448.
123. Robinson, 62 F.3d at 1327. Moreover, although the activity in this case happened to be
the cultivation of marijuana, countless innocent activities also produce specific heat signatures.
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The Robinson court continues its analysis by referring to Dow
Chemical Co. v. United States, 24 a second aerial surveillance case
decided by the Supreme Court. Citing Dow, the Robinson court frames
the issue as "whether the technology reveals 'intimate details.'1 25 In
Dow, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") hired a private firm
to take aerial photographs of the company's 2,000-acre chemical manu-
facturing facility. 26 The photographer used cameras that were sophisti-
cated, yet commercial, and were commonly used in map-making. 27
The Court held that the photographs were "not so revealing of intimate
details as to raise constitutional concerns." 28  This conclusion was
based on the fact that "although [the photographs] undoubtedly give
EPA more detailed information than naked-eye views, they remain lim-
ited to an outline of the facility's buildings and equipment."129
The key factors in Dow were that the photographs only revealed
what was exposed to visual observation and what could have been
viewed legally without the use of any equipment. 30 The EPA did not
employ techniques to ascertain any information about activities occur-
ring within the buildings.13 1
In Robinson, however, the purpose of the FLIR was to obtain infor-
mation concerning Robinson's activities inside his home.' 32 Moreover,
the information ascertained via the thermal imager in Robinson presum-
ably could not have been obtained through natural senses, despite the
officer's proximity to Mr. Robinson's house.
The Robinson court contends that the FLIR surveillance was harm-
less in that it merely projected a "gross, nondiscrete bright image indi-
cating the heat emitted from the residence." 33 However, the Robinson
court fails to recognize that trained thermographers are able to attach
certain activities to these heat signatures.134 As the Court in Dow fore-
warned, "[iut may well be, as the Government concedes, that surveil-
124. Id. at 1329.
125. Robinson, 62 F.3d at 1329 (citations omitted).
126. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 229 (1986).
127. See id. at 231.
128. Id. at 238.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 238-39.
131. See id.
132. United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325, 1327 (1lth Cir. 1995).
133. Id. at 1330.
134. This is not hyperbole or paranoia; if it were, then the use of a thermal imager by law
enforcement officers would be useless with regard to obtaining incriminating evidence. For
example, in United States v. Ishmael, two thermographers were able to correctly conclude from a
thermal imager that the Ishmaels were indeed cultivating marijuana. See United States v. Ishmael,
48 F.3d 850, 852 (5th Cir. 1995). Furthermore, had the Ishmaels been growing roses or running a
tanning salon it would not have made the surveillance any less intrusive.
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lance of private property by using highly sophisticated surveillance
equipment not generally available to the public .... might be constitu-
tionally proscribed absent a warrant."'' 35 At least in the Eleventh Cir-
cuit, this warning has fallen upon deaf ears.
The Robinson court then suggests that no Fourth Amendment viola-
tion occurred as "there was no intrusion whatsoever into Robinson's
home because the emitted heat rose from his house and then was mea-
sured by the FLIR surveillance."' 36 The Supreme Court has previously
used this exact rationale when it argued that no Fourth Amendment vio-
lation occurs through the use of microphones 137 or wiretaps so long as
"[t]here [is] no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants."'' 31
Therefore, just as sound vibrations travel into the atmosphere, so do heat
emissions. Reliance on this rationale by the Robinson court is misplaced
since the Supreme Court explicitly overruled this line of reasoning
nearly thirty years ago.' 39  In Katz, the Court held that "it [has]
become[ ] clear that the reach of [the Fourth] Amendment cannot turn
upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given
enclosure." 4 o
Fourth Amendment analysis has come full-circle, back to 1928
when Olmstead was decided.' 4 ' The rationale used in Katz is no longer
controlling in the Eleventh Circuit.'42 The Robinson court, as did the
Olmstead'4 3 and Goldman"' Courts, focuses on whether a physical tres-
pass occurred. " 5 The Robinson court argues that infared surveillance
does not violate the Fourth Amendment because a thermal imager "'does
not send any beams or rays into the area on which it is fixed or in any
way penetrate[s] structures within that area.""11 4 6 The correct issue, how-
ever, as set forth in Katz, is not whether physical penetration occurred
but whether the surveillance "violate[s] the privacy upon which [the
135. Dow Chemical Co., 476 U.S. at 238. While most people own cameras, some even highly
sophisticated, the Robinson court would be hard pressed to walk into people's homes and find a
thermal imager lying next to the power drill or weed-wacker. Moreover, while it can be argued
that a thermal imager simply enhances an individual's natural sense of touch, a person cannot
measure heat signatures. This is quite different than a camera which only enhances and magnifies
what otherwise might be seen by the natural eye.
136. Robinson, 62 F.3d at 1330.
137. See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134-35 (1942).
138. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928).
139. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
140. Id.
141. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 438.
142. Unfortunately, Supreme Court decisions do not have the luxury of nine lives.
143. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466.
144. Goldman, 316 U.S. at 134-35.
145. Robinson, F.3d at 1330.
146. Id. at 1330 n.7 (quoting United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 856 (5th Cir. 1995)
(quoting United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220, 223 (D. Haw. 1991))).
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defendant] justifiably relie[s] ... and [t]he fact that the electronic device
employed.., did not happen to penetrate the wall of the booth can have
no constitutional significance."1 4 7 The Katz Court held that the peti-
tioner was justified in relying on Fourth Amendment protection from the
"uninvited ear" while inside a public telephone booth.14 Certainly, a
person is justified to rely on Fourth Amendment protection from the
uninvited thermal imager while inside his or her home. 4 9
At this point of the court's objective expectation of privacy analy-
sis, the Greenwood case is significant in its absence. 150 Most courts
which have found that the use of thermal imagery does not constitute a
search have cited Greenwood for support. In those cases, the courts
have suggested that putting one's garbage on the curb is the same as
deliberately venting heat.1 5' This analysis is unsound however because
the use of a thermal imager is vastly less common than the rummaging
through garbage by "animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other
members of the public,"'' 52 and it was the commonality of these occur-
rences which the Court used as a basis for denying the existence of a
reasonable expectation of privacy in one's garbage.1 53
Moreover, while the garbage-heat analogy is a tenuous argument at
best, it is one that the Robinson court cannot make. In Greenwood, the
Court reasoned that there is no objectively reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy because people deliberately relinquish their garbage to third per-
sons, garbage collectors. 54 However, in Robinson, the defendant did
not deliberately vent the heat.155 Therefore, although the Robinson court
correctly omitted Greenwood from its opinion, it should also have omit-
ted cases which relied on Greenwood.156
The Robinson court then suggests that use of "infared surveillance
to ascertain heat intensity is analogous to the warrantless use of drug-
147. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
148. Id. at 352.
149. The heightened expectation of privacy afforded to the home is discussed infra.
150. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
151. United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668, 670 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d
992, 997 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1058 (8th Cir. 1994).
152. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40 (footnotes omitted).
153. Id. at 40-41.
154. Id. at 41.
155. United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325, 1328 (1 1th Cir. 1995).
156. See, Myers, 46 F.3d at 670; Ford, 34 F.3d at 997; Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1058. These courts
have misapplied Greenwood to cases involving intentional venting of heat by wrongly analogizing
garbage on the street to heat emissions in the atmosphere. Moreover, the Robinson court has
compounded the significance of these misapplications by expanding these holdings and applying
them to all thermal imagery cases, thereby ignoring the Supreme Court's decision in Greenwood
which hinged on the defendant's deliberate relinquishment of his "garbage."
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detecting dogs to locate contraband."' 57 In United States v. Place, the
Supreme Court explained that a canine sniff "discloses only the presence
or absence of narcotics, a contraband item."' 58 Indeed, it is perfectly
legal to emit heat. Unlike a canine sniff, a thermal imager detects heat
emissions from everything: people, lamps, stoves, etc.159 The Supreme
Court admitted that it was "aware of no other investigative procedure
that is so limited ... in the content of the information revealed by the
procedure."' 60  Because a thermal imager is incapable of limiting its
detection to illegal activities, the canine sniff analogy has no bite.
In its misuse of Place, the Robinson court also falls to recognize an
essential concept in Fourth Amendment analysis: "sanctity of the
home."'' The Robinson court contends that "'[j]ust as odor escapes a
compartment or building and is detected by the sense-enhancing instru-
ment of a canine sniff, so also does heat escape a home and is detected
by the sense-enhancing infared camera.""'1 62 Through this analysis, the
Robinson court has given people's homes the same constitutional protec-
tions as carry-on bags.
In fact, throughout the entire majority opinion, the Robinson court
fails to recognize the significance of the sanctity of one's home.' 6 3
Moreover, by comparing Robinson's home with the luggage in Place,"6
the Robinson court reveals its lack of recognition for the sanctity of the
home. 165 In Dow Chemical Co., the Court noted "that the Government
has 'greater latitude to conduct warrantless inspections of commercial
property' because 'the expectation of privacy that the owner of commer-
cial property enjoys in such property differs significantly from the sanc-
157. Robinson, 62 F.3d at 1330 (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983)).
158. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 707 (1983).
159. In United States v. Field, the court noted that the thermal imager had detected heat
emitted from a dehumidifier in a closet. 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1519 (W.D. Wis. 1994).
160. Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
161. Robinson, 62 F.3d at 1330. A person has the highest expectation of privacy from within
the sanctity of his or her home. See, e.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714-16 (1984);
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 531
(1967); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961).
162. Robinson, 62 F.3d at 1330 (quoting United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1058 (8th Cir.
1994)).
163. Id. at 1328-30. This is true in both the subjective and objective expectation of privacy
analyses.
164. Id. at 1330.
165. In fact, the Second Circuit has held that a canine sniff used outside the defendant's
apartment constituted a search prohibited under the Fourth Amendment. See United States v.
Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1366-67 (2d Cir. 1985). The court stated that "a practice that is not
intrusive in a public airport may be intrusive when employed at a person's home." Id. at 1366.
Therefore, "[b]ecause of the [defendant's] heightened expectation of privacy inside his dwelling,
the canine sniff at his door constituted a search." Id. at 1367.
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tity accorded an individual's home."'"66 This distinction between home
and commercial property was a critical factor in the Court's decision
that the aerial surveillance of commercial buildings did not constitute a
search under the Fourth Amendment.1 67
The Supreme Court, through its analysis of the Fourth Amendment,
has endorsed a heightened expectation of privacy in the sanctity of one's
home. 168  This concept is illustrated through a comparison of two
Supreme Court decisions: United States v. Knotts and United States v.
Karo.169 Both of these cases involved the warrantless use of electronic
tracking devices.' 70 In both cases, "beepers" were placed inside contain-
ers of chemicals that the defendants bought presumably to aid in the
manufacturing of drugs.1 7
In Knotts, the police followed the defendant's car with help from
the beeper.' 72 At some point, the police lost all contact with the car. 17 3
However, later the police were able to pick up the signal from the beeper
which was determined to be inside a cabin.' 74 Once the location of the
beeper was ascertained, the monitoring ended.' 75 The Court held that
use of the beeper did not constitute a search because it did not reveal any
information about activities within the cabin, and any information pro-
vided by the beeper was ascertainable through constant visual
surveillance. 176
On the other hand, in Karo, the tracking continued for several
months. 77  First, the defendant transported the marked container
through public roads to his house.' 78 Then the defendant took the
container to another defendant's home.' 79 Next, the defendant trans-
ported the container to a commercial storage facility, then to a third
defendant's home, and finally to a house rented by all three defend-
166. Dow Chemical Co., 476 U.S. 227, 237-38 (1986) (quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S.
594, 598-99 (1981)).
167. See id.
168. See, e.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 590 (1980); Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967);
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961).
169. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983);
see also State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593 (Wash. 1994) (comparing Knotts and Karo).
170. See Karo, 468 U.S. at 707; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278.
171. See Karo, 468 U.S. at 707; Knots, 460 U.S. at 278.
172. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278.
173. See id.
174. See id. at 278.
175. See id.
176. See id. at 282.
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ants. 180 The Court held, as in Knotts, that while traveling on public
roads or while in the storage facility, the monitoring of the beeper did
not constitute a search because the defendants had no protected rights of
privacy in activities occurring in public places. 18 1 However, each time
the container entered a home, the continued monitoring of the beeper
was deemed a search because it "reveal[ed] a critical fact about the inte-
rior of the premises that the Government... could not have otherwise
obtained without a warrant."' 82
Unlike the Eleventh Circuit in Robinson, the Supreme Court in
Karo was not concerned with whether the beeper revealed intimate,
definitive or detailed information from within the house. 8 3 On the con-
trary, the only information revealed to the officers in Karo was that the
beeper was inside of the defendant's house. 84 However, the Supreme
Court found this revelation sufficient to constitute an unlawful search
under the Fourth Amendment. 85
The Robinson court argues that a thermal imager is not as evasive
as an X-ray machine and therefore not sufficient to trigger Fourth
Amendment protections. 86 In essence, the Robinson court sets the limit
for warrantless governmental intrusion at the use of an X-ray machine.
However, while a thermal imager may not be the functional equivalent
of an X-ray machine, a thermal imager certainly reveals more informa-
tion about activities transpiring within a home than does a beeper. Nev-
ertheless, in a day and age where advancing technology continuously
strengthens the threat of governmental intrusion, instead of resuscitating
an already weakened Fourth Amendment and reaffirming the sanctity of
one's home, the Robinson court has left the front door wide open.
The Supreme Court in Karo stated that "[a]t the risk of belaboring
the obvious, private residences are places in which the individual nor-
mally expects privacy free of governmental intrusion not authorized by a
warrant, and that expectation is plainly one that society is prepared to
recognize as justifiable."'8 7 What was obvious to the Supreme Court
however, has been forgotten in the Eleventh Circuit. In both Robinson
and Karo, surveillance equipment was used to reveal information about
activities occurring inside of a house that otherwise could not have been
180. Id. at 709-10.
181. See id. at 720-21.
182. Id. at 715.
183. See id.
184. Id. at 715.
185. See id. at 716.
186. United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325, 1330 (1 1th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v.
Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 856 (5th Cir. 1995)).
187. Karo, 468 U.S. at 714. In light of today's state of the law in the Eleventh Circuit, it seems
only fitting that the Supreme Court voiced this comment in 1984.
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obtained. 188 Furthermore, unlike the information obtainable by a ther-
mal imager, almost all information revealed via a beeper could be ascer-
tained simply by monitoring a persons home from outside.
This Casenote does not contend that the Robinson decision will
lead to the demise of an individual's Fourth Amendment right to privacy
in the Eleventh Circuit. Instead, this Casenote suggests that this time
has already come. The Robinson court mandates that a person take eva-
sive actions to conceal heat emissions in order to maintain a subjective
expectation of privacy and satisfy the first prong of the Katz two-prong
test.18 9 Next, in its analysis of Mr. Robinson's objective expectation of
privacy, the court takes a "sanctity of the heat" approach and ignores the
sanctity of the home. The court suggests that it is unreasonable for soci-
ety to recognize an expectation of privacy in one's heat. 190 However,
the court fails to acknowledge that these heat signatures reveal informa-
tion about activities transpiring from within a home. Instead, the court is
solely concerned with whether a physical penetration into the home
actually occurred. 191
Finally, the Robinson court argues that a thermal imager is not as
evasive as an X-ray machine and cannot reveal intimate information. 92
The court states that "we are unconvinced that society ever would accept
use of the Fourth Amendment to shield unlawful activity within one's
home when there are noninvasive methods of detecting such criminal
activity . . . ."19' However, a thermal imager detects heat emissions
from all activities, not just illegal ones. Thus, the court is implying that
the use of a thermal imager on Mr. Robinson's home was justified by the
fact that he was indeed cultivating marijuana instead of cultivating flow-
ers or consummating a relationship.' 94 The court assumes that individu-
als are prepared to have every household monitored in order to detect
illegal activities. However, this contradicts what Justice Brandeis pro-
claimed, that "the right to be let alone" is "the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men."' 95
It would seem fitting at this point to list a parade of technical hor-
rors associated with the futuristic development of thermal imagery.
188. See Karo, 468 U.S. at 715; Robinson, 62 F.3d at 1327.
189. Robinson, 62 F.3d at 1328. Moreover, this case focused on heat emissions however the
same rationale is applicable to sound, smell, sight etc., and, according to the Robinson court, a
person must take steps to avoid detection from any form of technological surveillance equipment.
Id.
190. See id. at 1329-30.
191. See id. at 1330 n.7.
192. Id. at 1329-30.
193. Id. at 1330.
194. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
195. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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However, such an exercise would only detract from the relevance of the
Robinson decision and would only create a false sense of security by
implying that the effects of this decision will not be felt until some time
in the future. However, the future is here. Modern technology has bat-
tled the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment, and in United
States v. Robinson, the Eleventh Circuit has awarded thermal imagery a
technical knockout.
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